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Abstract
In this paper, an event-centric commodity trading sim-
ulation powered by the multiagent framework is pre-
sented. The purpose of this simulation platform is for
training novice traders. The simulation is progressed
by announcing news events that affect various aspects
of the commodity supply chain. Upon receiving these
events, market agents that play the roles of producers,
consumers, and speculators would adjust their views on
the market and act accordingly. Their actions would
be based on their roles and also their private informa-
tion, and collectively they shape the market dynamics.
This simulation has been effectively deployed for sev-
eral training sessions. We will present the underlying
technologies that are employed and discuss the practi-
cal significance of such platform.
Introduction
Commodity trading is probably one of the most ancient eco-
nomic activity, and the spot markets for commodities are in
existence since the dawn of the human history. Over the cen-
turies, the scope for the so-called “commodity” has grown
from agricultural commodities to include metals and energy;
in recent years, even “virtual entities” like carbon credits for
emission are considered as commodities and are traded ac-
tively just like traditionally defined commodities. The na-
ture of trading has also evolved from primitive barter ex-
change (direct exchange of goods or services without mon-
etary instrument) to more sophisticated forward contracting
between producers and consumers (agreement to buy or sell
at a fixed price at a future period), to formal Futures ex-
changes with clearing houses guaranteeing the transactions.
Since the scope of the commodities is casted so wide, and
the available financial instruments are so rich, managing the
trade of commodities effectively has become more and more
important but also extremely challenging.
What makes trading in commodity markets unique and
challenging, despite its similarity to equity and bond mar-
kets, is the physical transactions that are behind all the fi-
nancial trades in any form of commodity market. Although
the volume in the financial trades (commodity derivatives)
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has already overtaken the physical trades, physical transac-
tions are still critically important. This is because the bal-
ance of supply and demand and the resulting spot prices in
the physical transactions are still the fundamental forces that
are behind the commodity market, and no matter how so-
phisticated the used financial instruments are, all of them
still need to closely reference these spot prices.
This is why trading in commodity market is challenging:
physical transactions are affected by all the physical ele-
ments that link together the supply and demand sides. For
example, transportation disruption or freight rate changes
will propagate through the supply chain and generate re-
gional imbalances in supply or demand; the resulting im-
pact could then be felt in all the related industries and com-
modity classes. Other factors, like new legislations, abnor-
mal weather, or even political events could also exert com-
plicated and significant impacts on the commodity market.
Therefore, to trade successfully in a particular commodity
market, one need to be very familiar with the physical prop-
erties and the supply chain of that commodity. These re-
quirements are the primary barriers in training successful
commodity traders. On the other hand, these sophisticated
requirements probably also help to explain why fully auto-
mated trading has not taken over the commodity trading yet.
This is what motivates our research in the commodity
trading simulation. On one hand, we would like to create
a commodity trading simulation that is realistic enough so
that novice commodity traders could be trained effectively.
On the other hand, we are also interested in studying human
trader’s trading behaviors in the face of complicated envi-
ronment, with the ultimate goal of making software agents
trade just as human traders in the commodity market.
Despite the fact that there is a vast amount of literature
in economics and finance on commodity price modeling, we
find them not suitable for our purposes. One of the major
missing features in these models is the link between physi-
cal events and the price dynamics. These links are important
because one of the highly valued skills in trading commod-
ity is the correct readings of the physical events and also the
ability to carry out appropriate trades with these understand-
ings. To address this need, we thus propose an event-centric
simulation model in which the price dynamics is created by
a series of user-defined events. By allowing events to be
user-defined, we also grant ourselves the ability of creating
scenarios that are rarely seen but important, e.g., the recent
commodity boom and the subsequent market crash.
To create an event-centric commodity trading simulation,
we adopt a constructive approach which is widely studied
by researchers in the area of agent-based computational eco-
nomics. Stated conceptually, our idea is to introduce multi-
ple market agents with different physical roles into the sys-
tem. When an event is announced in the simulation, each
agent would trade depending on its role, private information,
and also the event properties. The market dynamics would
then be shaped by their joint actions. As demonstrated in
our experiment, it is shown that complicated price dynamics
could be generated with fairly simple agent strategies.
System Overview
There are three important components in our commodity
trading simulation (see Figure 1): (a) human traders; (b)
market server (servicing market mechanism and dispatching
events); (c) market agents (including hedgers and specula-
tors, which will be described in detail later).
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Figure 1: System architecture of the simulation.
Since one of our design goals is to provide an intuitive
and straightforward trading simulation for training novices,
we have proposed a highly simplified scenario that has only
one futures market for some commodity (the exact type of
the commodity, as we demonstrate later, can be specified
by the user). Although the spot market is purposely hidden
from the human traders, it is included in our consideration
when creating market agents. To streamline the trading, we
drop all the tedious steps in finalizing a transaction and as-
sume that the matchings of all transactions are instantaneous
without default and are handled by a standard Continuous
Double Auction (CDA). In most simulations, human partic-
ipants are assumed to be pure speculators that trade only for
profit. For simplicity, we assume that for now we will ig-
nore the daily settlement of futures contracts. This implies
that margin calls will not be modeled and the cash flows
will be computed only when a transaction is made (establish
or close out certain position). However, we do require that
agents not exceeding their position limits at all times.
The market mechanism, event dispatcher, action monitor,
and all the required communication infrastructures are de-
veloped based on the AB3D (Lochner, Cheng, and Wellman
2007), a generic market game server. The list of events is
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Figure 2: A typical event with all the important parameters.
predetermined by the scenario designer, where each event is
defined by the following parameters (a sample event can be
seen in Figure 2):
Title and content: This information provides qualitative
event information and is mainly for human traders.
Arrival time: The time (t0) when the event is delivered
and visible to all agents (both human traders and market
agents). It is assumed that all agents receive event at the
same time, without discrimination.
Impact: This parameter specifies the type and the strength
of the event. The strength of an event is specified by an
integer in [1, 5], where 5 indicates the strongest event and
1 indicates the weakest event. An event could be either
bullish or bearish, and is indicated by the sign of the im-
pact. Events with positive and negative impacts would be
bullish and bearish respectively. The ‘realized function of
impact” is the unique response each market agent has to
this event.
Effective time window: The event is only effective within
the time window [ts, te]. With these two parameters we
could create events with short-term or long-term impacts.
Also, by overlapping a series of events we could model
the escalation of a major event (e.g., the impact on crude
oil price exerted by the progression of the war in Iraq).
Note that both “impact” and “effective time window” are not
revealed to the human traders and only the market agents
can utilize these parameters. Besides qualitative event infor-
mation, human traders also have access to the latest market
information in the form of price quotes (however, they can-
not peek into the order book). Both ask and bid quotes are
provided to them in real-time.
By hiding the impact and the exact time when an event
would be effective, human traders will be exposed to an un-
certain environment similar to the real market, in which they
have to estimate these two parameters solely by the qual-
itative content of the event. Of course, the realism of the
simulation will be highly dependent on the behaviors of the
market agents, which are elaborated in the next section.
Figure 3: Human trader’s interface.
The human trader’s interface could be seen in Figure 3.
As illustrated in Figure 3, the trading interface contains six
major components: 1) account information; 2) list of trans-
actions; 3) current standing bid; 4) bid panel; 5) list of
events; 6) price chart. For the human trader, this interface
provides access to both event-related information (double-
clicking on any event would open up a pop-up window con-
taining previously mentioned information) and also market
information (bid and ask prices, and also the status of current
valid bid submitted by this trader). At any given moment,
long or short bid could be issued by clicking either “Long”
or “Short” button, at the price and the quantity specified by
the trader. Regardless of the status of the current bid, it will
always be replaced by the newly submitted bid. Note that
although the prices specified by the user’s bid and reported
by the market are in physical units (e.g., barrels for crude oil
and bushels for grains), traders cannot trade in physical units
directly; instead, traders have to trade in standard commod-
ity contracts that contain different numbers of physical units
for different commodity types. For example, one crude oil
contract usually contains 1,000 barrels and one grain con-
tract usually contains 5,000 bushels. In our trading simula-
tion, the “Trading Unit” (TU), which represents the contract
size, is introduced to accommodate different commodities.
In the above examples, TU is set to 1,000 and 5,000 respec-
tively for crude oil and grain.
Besides the purpose of trading, this interface is also used
as an action monitor. Any action performed in this interface
(viewing an event’s detail or sending out a trade command)
would be recorded and sent to the server for collection. This
information will be available at the end of the simulation for
further analysis (an example of such analysis is presented in
the later section).
As hinted in the earlier discussion, our aim is to provide a
completely flexible trading simulation. By modifying TU
and also defining new stream of events, we could design
trading scenarios for a wide variety of commodities.
Designing Market Agents
As in most other training-oriented trading simulations, fi-
delity and realism are some of the most important fea-
tures we would like to achieve. To create simulations with
high fidelity, a number of academic and commercial ap-
plications has deliberately created a linkage between trad-
ing simulations and the real market (e.g., see UMOO at
http://www.umoo.com/ and FACTSim at http://
www.factsim.org/). In these cases, real-time market
data feeds are what constitute the market dynamics. How-
ever, this type of design is not suitable for our purpose be-
cause an user-composed sequence of events is what drives
the price movement. To realize our proposed model, we
need to describe the occurred events quantitatively and to
come up with the reaction model (to these events) for differ-
ent market participants. More formally speaking, we break
down the market by introducing independent agents as im-
portant market participants, embed appropriate trading strat-
egy into each agent, and then let these agents interact in or-
der to create market dynamics collectively. Therefore, the
design of market agents is the most critical part of our com-
modity trading simulation.
Using agents in modeling complex economic or finan-
cial systems is not new, in fact, a large number of literature
has been devote to the subject of “Agent-based Computa-
tional Economics” (ACE) (LeBaron 2001; Tesfatsion 2002;
2006). The ACE is probably best explained in Tesfatsion’s
own words (Tesfatsion 2006):
The defining characteristic of ACE models is their con-
structive grounding in the interactions of agents, ...
Starting from an initially specified system state, the
motion of the state through time is determined by en-
dogenously generated agent interactions.
Our model follows similar constructive principle, with the
introduction of events as a way to guide agents’ actions.
In our market model, we place the modeling emphasis
on hedgers and speculators. Their internal respond models,
which take event occurrences and market states as inputs,
will determine how the market evolves (of course, actions
from human traders will also influence the market evolu-
tion). The roles and the models of hedgers and speculators
will be explained in detail in the following two subsections.
It should be noted that the framework in which we develop
our market agents is quite open and flexible. Therefore if
necessary, ourselves or any third-party could easily develop
new types of agents and add them to the mix as appropriate.
Hedger Model
Hedgers are the original users of the futures market. They
are usually producers or consumers of the commodity who
would like to lock in at some specific prices and quantities
well before the time of production (for producers) or usage
(for consumers). These producers and consumers provide
basic liquidity and are the main drivers of the supply and
demand in the market.
To properly incorporate producers and consumers in our
model, we assume that they exhibit stationary behaviors, i.e.,
the rate of their production and consumption will be station-
ary. Since we assume that only one futures market exists
for this commodity, this assumption implies that all produc-
ers and consumers have to constantly establish new hedges
in this market, and their collective actions will create the
market dynamics accordingly. We further assume that all
producers and consumers will employ a simple hedge-and-
forget strategy, meaning that they will establish new hedges
based on their own needs (new productions or usages), the
current market condition, and their expectation; but once the
hedges are established, they will hold them to the end (in
other words, no dynamic hedge will be considered).
To construct market agents based on these simplifications,
we assume that at a given interval (which could be stochas-
tic and agent-specific), a new long (short) bid will be is-
sued by the consumer (producer) agent. The quantity of
the bid will be randomly drawn from a uniform distribution
U [Qmin, Qmax], in which Qmin and Qmax represent lower
and upper bounds on agent’s capacity, and again these two
parameters are agent-specific. By manipulating Qmin and
Qmax across all market agents, human traders could experi-
ence different level of market power (larger Q values corre-
spond to smaller market power, and vice versa).
The price of the bid will depend on individual market
agent’s latest price forecast, which is computed based on the
recent price trend, current spot price (it’s assumed to be in-
ternal to the agent and not explicitly modeled), and also the
estimated impact of the latest event. We first assume that
a perfect forecast can be made and derive the perfect fore-
cast. We will then discuss how agents could approximate
this perfect forecast.
Commodity prices tend to be mean-reverting at the level
of marginal cost of production. This has been shown to be
true in a wide variety of commodities (e.g., see Geman and
Nguyen (2005)). To model commodity prices, we thus have
to look for models that are mean-reverting. One such model
is the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (OU) process, which is originally
proposed by Vasicek (1977) for modeling interest rates. Be-
cause of its mean-reverting feature, the OU process has been
a popular choice for modeling commodity prices in recent
years. Besides mean-reversion, events also play an impor-
tant role in our simulation. To incorporate the event impacts
into the model, we follow the jump diffusion model proposed
by Merton (1976). Finally, to properly implement the re-
sulting price evolution model in our simulation, we prefer a
discrete-time model (as opposed to the original continuous-
time model). Our choice is a discrete-time variant described
by Blanco and Soronow (2001).
In our simulation, the price forecast at time t is deter-
mined by:
Pf (t) = Pe(t) + n(t) + (t),
where Pe(t) is the equilibrium price derived from the market
price information, and it follows the mean reversion model:
Pe(t) = µ+ λ(
Pa(t) + Pb(t)
2
− µ).
µ is the mean price modeled in the simulation, λ is the
weight for mean correction, and the current market price is
estimated as the average of Pb(t) (bid price, which is the
price of the highest untransacted long bid) and Pa(t) (ask
price, which is the price of the lowest untransacted short
bid). n(t) is the estimated impact of the most recent event
at time t, and is both event and agent specific. n(t) could be
defined as arbitrary functions and its simplest form (the one
we adopted) exerts constant impact within an event’s effec-
tive time range (i.e., n(t) = c, t0 ≤ t ≤ t1, and n(t) = 0
otherwise). (t) is the white noise (followsN(0, 1), the stan-
dard normal distribution).
There is a long list of reasons why such perfect predic-
tion could not be obtained for all market agents. It could
be that some agents have limited capabilities, both in terms
of modeling or information acquisition. It could also be that
the established hedge is not perfect (i.e., the desired maturity
date and the commodity category don’t match futures con-
tract exactly). In our simulation, such approximation on the
agent side is accounted for by introducing randomized bid-
ding within the range of the perfect price prediction and the
market price. Since Pa(t) and Pb(t) are deemed as the com-
modity market price by the producers and consumers respec-
tively, the prices submitted by producers are uniformly dis-
tributed in [min{Pf (t), Pa(t)},max{Pf (t), Pa(t)}], while
the prices submitted by consumers are uniformly distributed
in [min{Pf (t), Pb(t)},max{Pf (t), Pb(t)}].
Speculator
While “mean-reverting” hedgers constitute the “fundamen-
tal” part of the simulated market, most of the liquidity and
volatility, on the other hand, is generated by the specula-
tor agents. In our simulation, we adopt the classical zero
intelligence (ZI) strategy (Gode and Sunder 1993) in con-
structing our speculator agent. However, to prevent ZI
agents from destroying the market trend (generated by pro-
ducer and consumer agents), we limit the price range to be
[Pb(t) − δ, Pa(t) + δ], where Pb(t) and Pa(t) are bid and
ask prices as defined previously, and δ is an agent param-
eter, controlling how aggressive this ZI agent should be in
creating volatility. In most of our simulations, we simply set
δ to be the bid increment.
After the price is randomly decided, the ZI agent will
choose to take either long or short positions with equal prob-
ability. Since the ZI agent us constrained by a given position
limit, it will randomly decide how much remaining position
allowance it would devote to the new trade. As speculators,
ZI agents are required to exit all positions at the end, and
they are programmed to gradually exit their positions when
the end draws near.
Validating Event Dynamics
The multiagent model presented in the previous section is
pretty general and can be used in a wide variety of scenar-
ios. As long as the scenario designer can come up with a
list of events that follow the event specification, the above
multiagent model could then generate the desired market dy-
namics.
The challenge here is: how do we know whether the gen-
erated market dynamics is what should be expected from
the designed scenario? This is not a straightforward task
since the scenario we plan to execute might be completely
fictitious and it does not need to have a real-world counter-
part. Without benchmark data, establishing the credibility
of the simulation would not be easy. Of course, if the gen-
erated market dynamics together with the market scenario
is carefully reviewed by a commodity expert, we probably
could come up with an assessment qualitatively. However,
this would not be feasible if we plan for large-scale and fre-
quent deployments. Therefore, we need some method that is
quantitative and could be automated.
Fortunately, this is the type of question economists are re-
peatedly asked in various settings. And in accounting and
financial economics, researchers have long been studying
statistical approaches that can measure the effects of an eco-
nomic event. This type of approaches is called event studies.
There are many variants of event studies, and we will adopt
the version proposed by MacKinlay (1997). According to
MacKinlay, the procedure for an event study is as follows
(some steps not necessary for our application are dropped):
• Define the event of interest and identify the event win-
dow. In our case, the event of interest and its occurrence
is straightforward to define, and we will take 20 days be-
fore and after the event occurrence as the event window.
• Measure the abnormal return (AR), which is the actual re-
turn minus the normal return of the commodity over the
event window. Normal return could be obtained by simply
assuming constant mean return model. In the commodity
market setting, it refers to the mean price of the commod-
ity from the beginning of the horizon to just before the
beginning of the event window..
• From AR, compute cumulative abnormal return (CAR) to
draw overall inferences for the event of interest.
• Define null hypothesis H0 and perform statistical tests
over multiple sample instances. For all events, the null
hypothesis H0 can be defined as CAR = 0. As for the al-
ternative hypothesis, H1, it can be define as CAR > 0
for bullish events, CAR < 0 for bearish events, and
CAR 6= 0 for neutral events (or no event).
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Figure 4: A sample price dynamics of the one-event sce-
nario. The event is announced at around day 160.
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Figure 5: The cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for
bullish, bearish, and normal scenarios.
To validate that our multiagent model indeed creates de-
tectable market dynamics in response to events, we create
a special scenario with only one event (a sample price evo-
lution of this scenario is shown in Figure 4). For the market
agents, we include 12 producers, 13 consumers, and no spec-
ulator (to avoid introducing unnecessary noise). To collect
enough sample data points, the same scenario is executed 15
times. Following the above procedures, we test the null hy-
pothesis with three CAR series (one of the sample is shown
in Figure 5). For both the bullish and the bearish cases, the
p-values ∼ 0, implying that strong positive/negative abnor-
mal returns are significant. For the normal (no-event) case,
p-value ∼ 0.065, indicating that no abnormal return is de-
tected in the event window.
Compared to the case of validating event occurrence,
validating the strength of an event is much more difficult.
This is because the absolute level of response that should
be triggered by an event cannot be determined straightfor-
wardly. Therefore, instead of trying to validate the abso-
lute response strength, we choose to validate the relative
response strengths. The objective of this is to ensure that
higher impact levels indeed generate larger market responses
when compared to events with lower levels. To establish
this, we could simply perform statistical comparisons be-
tween adjacent strength levels (i.e., compare levels 1 and 2,
2 and 3, and so on). With this validation, we could at least
be assured of the consistency in market responses through-
out the simulation.
Case Study: A Crude Oil Trading Simulation
The prototype of the described system has been deployed
for a number of trading courses since April, 2007. A re-
cent deployment at one such course on crude oil trading is
described here as an illustrative example.
The selected trading course was designed to give under-
graduate business students an overview on crude oil trading.
The course is 8-week long and it covers all the fundamental
topics related to the oil industry. Since the primary objective
of the course is to introduce students to the career as an oil
trader, significant amount of time has been spent on topics
related to effective oil trading. This course was concluded
with a trading simulation powered by our prototype system.
Background
Each participant in the simulation plays the role of a spec-
ulator and trades for profit. The targeted commodity is the
Western Texas Intermediate (WTI) and each trader can trade
up to a maximum of 2,000,000 barrels (bbls). A trader can
take either long or short positions, but once he reaches his
trading limit, he cannot take further positions in the same di-
rection (however, he could still trade to reduce his positions).
To encourage participation, we explicitly asked participants
to trade at least 100,000 bbls per trade and to transact at least
2,000,000 bbls during the simulation. The contract size is
1,000 bbls, thus the trading unit (TU) of this scenario is set
to be 1,000.
To exaggerate profits and losses and to encourage partic-
ipants to be decisive, the prices are set in the interval of 10
cents. Initial bid and ask prices are set to be $50.00/bbl and
$50.10/bbl respectively.
The scenario is designed to have 48 events, with event
intervals set to be somewhere between 1 to 2 minutes. Each
event begins to affect the market roughly 20 seconds after
its announcement. The resulting length of the simulation is
thus around 72 minutes. All traders are asked to return their
position balance to zero at the end of the simulation. They
will be penalized with the lowest possible mark-to-market
values if they hold any position at the end of the simulation.
The flow of events are composed by the course instructor.
The expected price trend that ought to be generated by the
flow of events is plotted in Figure 6. Note that no hint of
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Figure 6: The expected market price evolution.
any form is given to participants regarding the price trend.
Participants are only briefed on the initial market conditions
before the simulation.
Summary and Analysis
40 students participated in this trading simulation and most
of them ended up losing money. In fact, the average loss was
21 million dollars and only 8 out of 40 ended up earning
profits. Since simulation session like this one is meant for
training novices, participants must be given a chance to re-
view their trading strategies after the simulation so that they
can be debriefed on what might have gone wrong. After the
simulation, each participant could review his trading history
and also the trading chart characterizing his trading strategy.
This trading chart is composed of three important time se-
ries: (a) expected market prices (to be generated by the flow
of events), (b) observed price quotes, and (c) player’s po-
sition balance. (c) is the realization of the trading strategy,
and it might take (a) and/or (b) as inputs. In some cases,
such connections are obvious; e.g., the trading chart for one
of the best player is plotted in Figure 7, and it apparently fol-
lows the trend hinted by both the event disclosure and market
price. In some other cases, completely wrong interpretation
of the news events could happen, and in the extreme case,
some traders might even choose to bet arbitrarily disregard-
ing the market trend. Figure 8 shows trading chart for one
such player, and not surprisingly, he is also one of the worst
traders in the simulation.
It should be emphasized that we do not intend to offer a
comprehensive analysis on all trading strategies. Instead, we
present these cases so that we could illustrate the potential
of our system in helping individuals spotting flaws in their
strategies. Such observations would be extremely valuable
in improving their trading skills.
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Figure 7: The best trader in the simulation: a trend follower.
Thick line is player’s position balance; thin line is real mar-
ket price; dotted line is estimated market price dynamics.
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Figure 8: The worst trader in the simulation: no discernable
trading strategy. See Figure 7 for legend.
Discussion
In this paper, we present our efforts in building an agent-
based commodity trading simulation. The simulation sce-
nario progresses by user-defined news events. Our frame-
work is based on the constructive principle widely applied in
the agent-based computational economics community, and
the actors in our market are based on well-studied theoreti-
cal models. The fidelity of the market dynamics generated
by the multiagent framework is statistically provable by us-
ing the event study method.
Our aim in this research is not to create new pricing
models for commodities; instead, we have focused on how
to construct a highly realistic commodity trading simulator
from the building blocks that are well-founded theoretically.
The primary application of such framework is currently in
training human traders, and as demonstrated by a number
of deployments, such exercises are highly valuable for both
participants and us. The data that is collected during the sim-
ulation is extremely valuable in helping us better understand
what makes a good trader. On one hand, these analysis re-
sults could be used to improve the market agents employed
in our simulation. On the other hand, these analyses could
also help educators in designing better educational programs
that could more effectively teach the art of trading. Ulti-
mately, our platform might one-day be used in benchmark-
ing or diagnosing a trader’s skill.
We do notice that a large number of systems have already
been developed for the purpose of simulating commodity
trading. However, to the best of our knowledge, none of
them is truly flexible in terms of specifying scenario con-
tent (e.g., deciding properties of the target commodity and
flow of events) and also the way the market dynamics is
generated (in our system it could be changed if new mar-
ket agents are introduced). This flexibility, granted both by
the event-centric design and the multiagent-based approach,
is our contribution to the area of commodity trading simula-
tion.
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